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
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ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS AND ANTARCTICA

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Map of Territorial Claims in Antarctica (Missing 9/1/48)

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SUMMARY

Argentine territorial claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica challenge British possession of the Falklands and conflict with actual or potential claims in Antarctica by the governments of Great Britain, Chile, and the US. Tension between Argentina and Britain over their conflicting claims, which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica in February 1948, is the outgrowth of a century-old dispute over the Falklands and of recent changes in world power relationships. The dispute regarding the Falklands is an issue which remained quiet for over a century, during which British ascendancy was unquestioned. It now arises because Argentina can foresee the time when it might recover the islands by direct pressure or indirectly with the support of the US and the inter-American system. The dispute in Antarctica also reflects the growing ambitions of the Argentine Government. It differs from the Falklands question in that the rights of the claimants are less well-defined and because the Antarctic area is useful chiefly as a parade ground.

The tension that has been built up over claims in Antarctica and the Falklands may be dissipated gradually, but this will depend upon the willingness of Argentina to put the Falklands claims on a stand-by basis and to cease provocative gestures in Antarctica until such time as claims can be settled on an international basis. That the Perón administration will agree to such procedures is questionable. Although it has made no overt move to dislodge the British from the Falklands, it appears determined to force the issue either directly or by enlisting the support of the US and the inter-American system. As regards Antarctica, the Argentine Government will undoubtedly continue its operations and may expand them. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments have developed a stake in Antarctica as an inexpensive means of gaining prestige at home and abroad. This barren area

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offers an unrivalled ground for aggressive activity and it has thereby secured an importance to the South American governments out of proportion to its real value to them. In addition, unless both governments halt operations simultaneously, their latent rivalry will force them to continue a forward movement in Antarctica. The Argentine Government must also consider the value of pressure in the Antarctic in weakening the British position in the Falklands.

Recourse to the International Court to settle conflicting claims in the Falklands and Antarctica appears to be out of the question. Although Argentine rights in the Falklands are supported by many legal arguments, the Perón administration has indicated that it has no intention of submitting Argentine claims to the judicial process and anticipates settlement of the dispute on a power basis. Argentine and correlative Chilean claims in Antarctica are an even less promising subject for legal settlement and the two South American governments will avoid a court decision. Such a decision would in any case be difficult to reach in an area where occupation and normal exercise of sovereignty are impossible. The Argentine Government has, however, offered to settle Antarctic claims by the conference method and unofficially has indicated that it might accept arbitration. But since time works on the side of Argentina, its government may be expected to approach the problem of settlement in a leisurely fashion, even though it may eventually agree to some general Antarctic settlement.

The British Government is finding delay in a decision, which will relieve it of the threat of Argentine provocation, difficult and even intolerable. It is on the defensive in a remote area which provides only too accessible a target for rival claimants and British opinion has become extraordinarily sensitive to signs of dissolution of the Empire. Surrender to Argentine claims which cannot be rationalized as in accordance with the new principles of self-government and self-determination, will not be made voluntarily. Since the British Government appears unable to bring

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the South American claimants into court, it can secure relief regarding Antarctica only through a settlement sponsored by the US or UN. As to the Falklands, it is not clear what constructive step the British can take except as the US acts as honest broker.

The dividends in prestige to the Argentine Government from its challenge to British rights have been gratifying. From a minor and latent issue, the Antarctic dispute emerged early in February of this year with all the familiar trimmings of a nineteenth-century incident -- and in good time for the Argentine elections. If the Perón administration handles the matter skillfully, it may secure a resolution at the Bogotá Conference that would in the view of the Latin Americans, place in an unfavorable light the neutral attitude of the US and the defiant "imperialism" of the British Government. Argentine expressions have moreover been reserved enough to permit it to play a relatively passive role at Bogotá if the auspices are unfavorable. The Bogotá Conference offers only the possibility of obtaining moral support and perhaps of warning the US that it should back Argentina against the UK. As such it is an interesting opportunity for the Perón administration, but by no means one to be forced at the expense of other Argentine interests.

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ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLANDISLANDS AND ANTARCTICAINTRODUCTION

Argentine claims in the Falkland Islands and in Antarctic territory cover most of the area described by the British Government as the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and administered as a British colonial possession. British possession of the Falkland Islands proper is contested only by Argentina. The Falkland Island Dependencies, including a sector of the Antarctic and certain islands lying north of this sector, are the subject of claims by Argentina which overlap actual or potential claims of Britain, the United States, and Chile. Against British protests the Argentine Government is at present acting to strengthen its position in Antarctica and the Chilean Government is doing likewise. As regards the Falklands, Argentina has so far done little more than keep open its claim through repeated formal statements of its right to the Islands and has made no overt move to dislodge the British from possession.* In a conversation of March 9, 1948 the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that Argentina was "prepared to argue" its Antarctic claims, but that it regarded the Falklands dispute as a matter of real importance which the Perón administration was determined to settle.

The Argentine claims in the Falklands and Antarctica are interrelated in various ways although the Argentine Government has treated them as separate and distinct problems. The regional and political ties between

* Various press accounts have confused the Falklands with the Falkland Islands Dependencies. For example, both the editors of the New York Times and Sumner Welles have discussed the dispute between the British and South American Governments over Antarctic claims as though it were a dispute over the Falkland Islands.

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Argentine and British claims to the two areas mean that activity in one region is reflected to some degree in the other. Both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica depend in part on their respective claims to the Falklands. Conversely, the advance of the South American governments in Antarctica has a bearing on the Falklands question insofar as it adversely affects the position of British territories in the Western Hemisphere.

The American Government has endeavored to maintain a neutral position with regard to the Falkland Islands dispute and has adopted the attitude that it is a matter involving only the two parties. As to the Antarctic area as a whole, the American Government so far has not formulated a positive policy. It has made no territorial claims but reserves its rights and refuses to recognize the claims of other governments in the area. Neither the Monroe Doctrine nor the establishment of the hemisphere defense zone, which embraces the area in dispute, is viewed as affecting rights in the Falkland Islands or Antarctica, and the two disputes are regarded by the American Government as matters to be settled on a separate basis. Recent developments in Antarctica, however, indicate that Argentine and Chilean policy in the region may have issue in a situation demanding the consideration of the Department. As to the Falklands the Argentine Foreign Minister on March 9, 1948 approached the American Ambassador with the suggestion that the American Government support Argentina in forcing withdrawal of the British from possession of the islands. In addition both the Falkland Islands and Antarctic disputes are scheduled to be raised at Bogotá together with the entire question of the status of claims and possessions of non-continental powers in the Western Hemisphere. The following survey is devoted to a statement of the development of Argentine policy in the area and an estimate of the direction of that policy which may serve as background for these problems as they arise.

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I. ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLANDSA. Background of the Falkland Islands Question

The dispute between the Argentine and British Governments over the Falkland Islands emerged from a series of international incidents in the period 1831-33. Sealing and whaling activity in the South Atlantic region and the trade route to the East through the Drake Passage south of Cape Horn gave the Falklands a certain importance as a base. The Government of the United Provinces, successor to the rights of the Spanish Government, took possession of the islands in 1820 and established its representatives in the area. A dispute between the governor of the islands and American sealers led to punitive action by the USS Lexington in 1831 and the reduction of the islands to a defenseless condition. This action, which was supported by the American Government, apparently provided the setting for British seizure of the Falklands in January 1833. Subsequent Argentine protests against the British occupation and claims for damages against the American Government met with no success.

Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands appear to have considerable support on an historical basis. The Argentine Government has also more recently advanced a claim on the basis that the Falkland Islands are an extension of the continental shelf. Against British rights based on discovery in 1592, occupation since 1833, and somewhat shadowy claims asserted in the eighteenth century, the Argentine Government has stated its position many times: "The Argentine claim to those islands is incontrovertible and all that is lacking for this claim to be adjusted to a juridical precept is that the lawful sovereignty exercised over those islands be completed with the actual possession which is constantly demanded." Or, as a leading official of the Argentine Foreign Office recently stated to an officer of the American Embassy, the British took the Falkland Islands by force and if they did not voluntarily surrender them, Argentina would some day when powerful enough take the islands back by force.

B. Review of Argentine Position to 1934

For a century after the British occupation was effected, Argentine policy with respect to the Falkland

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Islands appears not to have developed beyond the reiteration of national rights by the Argentine Foreign Office as occasion offered. Without backing from a larger power, Argentina was by itself too weak to force the issue against the British Government, and such support was not forthcoming. In the 1880's the Argentine Government tried without success to secure the good offices of the American Government on the plea that the British had violated the Monroe Doctrine by seizure of the islands. In rejecting this appeal, the American Government relied upon the position that the Monroe Doctrine was not retroactive because British claims advanced against the Spanish Crown antedated the Doctrine, and that the latter was therefore inapplicable.

C. Review of Argentine Position since 1934

The Falkland Islands dispute in its modern phase dates from the early 1930's, when national claims to "nuestras Malvinas" became a popular issue. The resentment caused by British demands for trade and financial concessions at this time furnished an especially favorable setting for the active renewal of the dispute. With Foreign Office approval, Dr. Alfredo L. Palacios, leader of the Socialist Party, inaugurated a campaign for the return of the Falklands in a series of speeches delivered during the 1934 sessions of Congress. Pro-German elements in Argentina subsequently took advantage of the Falklands issue to inflame anti-British feeling. Until some time after the outbreak of the Second World War, renewed Argentine interest in the Falklands appears to have been largely unofficial and the result of agitation by leftist and nationalist intellectuals and anti-British groups. The Argentine delegations at the Panama and Habana meetings of Foreign Ministers reserved national rights in the Falklands according to the time-honored formula, but did not argue that the establishment of the defense zone as such affected the Falklands dispute.

The possibility of recovering the Falklands from British occupation apparently first began to receive serious official attention in 1941. The Argentine High Seas Fleet is reported to have sailed during this year under sealed orders -- countermanded at the last moment -- to occupy the Falklands. Whatever the basis for this report, in December 1941 the Argentine Government, for the first time since the exchange of notes in the 1880's, indicated

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a desire to secure the assistance of the American Government in regaining the Falklands. At this time the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Argentine naval defense plan envisaged an area in the South Atlantic including the Falkland Islands and that his government might request the good offices of the American Government for the purpose of inducing the British to withdraw from the Falklands. Embassy Buenos Aires commented that "the reason for this change in tactics is open to conjecture but it may be that the Argentines feel that they can now invite the cooperation of the United States by contending that it is necessary for the defense of Argentina as well as for continental security to have the Falklands under Argentine control." However this proposal should be interpreted, the course of the war and of Argentine relations with the US made it academic. The requirements of continental defense ceased for the time being to constitute a useful argument for the Argentine Government against British occupation of the Falklands, and, following the June 1943 Revolution, other problems absorbed the energies of Argentine policy-makers.

As a popular issue, the Falklands dispute had a natural appeal to the Argentine Congress which took office following the elections of February 1946. One of the earliest acts of the new Chamber of Deputies was to pass unanimously a resolution presented by an opposition Radical deputy that "it would view it with pleasure should the Executive Power, opportunely and with due urgency, address the Security Council of the United Nations affirming the sovereign rights of the Argentine Nation over the Islas Malvinas [Falklands], claiming from England, the nation holding them, the restitution of this territory." The Perón Government did not act upon the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies and in the United Nations limited its initiatives with respect to the Falklands to a stock reservation of rights in connection with resolutions on colonial areas. However, the administration took certain other indirect measures to strengthen Argentine claims in the Falklands. By decree of October 9, 1946, it affirmed national sovereignty over the "Argentine continental plateau" and the "Argentine epi-continental sea", citing a declaration of the American Government in 1945 establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf of the United States. This area, interpreted by both the American and Argentine Governments as extending to a point at which the sea is

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more than 100 fathoms deep, included the Falkland Islands. The insistence of the Argentine delegation that the hemisphere defense zone as finally established at the Conference of Rio de Janeiro in 1947 should include the Antarctic as well as the Falklands indicated that the Argentine Government viewed the regional defense measure as a potential source of support for its claims in both areas (see below, p. 15). In addition the Perón administration's aggressive development of Argentine claims in Antarctica, beginning in 1946 (see below, p. 11), represented a new threat to the British position in the Falklands.

The most recent move of the Perón administration with respect to the Falklands has been to revive the proposal that the American Government support Argentine efforts to regain the islands. In March 1948 the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that he and Perón felt that war with Russia was inevitable, that Argentina would join the US on the first day of war, and that Argentine possession of the Falklands was indispensable since the islands were the only base from which Russia could operate against Argentina. In these circumstances, the Foreign Minister stated, he hoped that the American Government would give Argentina support in making good its claims to the Falklands.

D. Current Argentine Policy in the Falklands

The Perón administration has made a more important issue of the Falklands than its predecessors, but activity in support of Argentine rights in the islands has thus far been limited to verbal measures. This policy is dictated by the facts of the situation. Argentina's interest in the Falklands is largely a matter of prestige. The British Government is in possession and has shown no willingness to withdraw in favor of Argentina. Argentina is not in a position to force the issue by direct diplomatic or military means and might lose rather than gain prestige from an attempt to do so. Although Argentina is thus dependent upon indirect pressure to make good its claims against the British, the Perón administration is setting the stage for recovery of the Falklands when occasion offers. Its forward movement in Antarctica has served to raise the question of claims in the Falklands to a more active status, since in connection with the Antarctic dispute, both parties use rights in the Falklands to

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support Antarctic claims. The discussion of Argentine claims in the Antarctic and official propaganda on behalf of such claims also works to heighten the national sense of grievance against British occupation of the Falklands. Likewise the claim to the Falklands as part of Argentina's "continental shelf" and the inclusion of the Falklands in the defense zone, however poor the legal arguments on either point, provide elements of support for Argentina's position in the Falklands dispute.

E. Future Prospects

It appears unlikely that the Falklands dispute will be decided on the merits of the case. Neither the Argentine nor the British Government appears willing to submit its claims to the International Court or to impartial arbitration. Since Argentina is not in a position to use force to make good its claims, it is also unlikely that the Falklands dispute will lead to a breach of the peace. However, Argentina may be able to substitute leverage for direct application of force. Even if the American Government is unwilling to force British withdrawal from the Falklands, the Argentine Government probably hopes to exert such leverage through the inter-American system and through its operations in Antarctica.

On the face of things Argentina cannot seriously affect the British position in the Falklands by raising the issue at the Bogotá Conference as it proposes to do. Inter-American resolutions condemning the maintenance of colonial possessions by non-continental powers within the hemisphere, asserting the sanctity of the hemisphere defense zone, and censuring "aggression" by non-continental powers in the defense zone would have no effect on the legal position of the British and no direct effect on its position in general. However, the Perón administration may see some possibility of maneuvering the American Government into bringing pressure on the British Government. Linking the colonial issue, the defense zone, and the question of "aggression" by a non-continental power, the Argentine delegation would be in a position to exploit certain ambiguities in American policy and to attack either directly or covertly the sincerity of American policy on colonial possessions and its reservations regarding the scope of the hemisphere defense agreement. In securing an inter-American resolution on the subject, Argentina might not only give additional color to its Falklands

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claims; it might also succeed in forcing the American Government out of its traditionally neutral position. If successful in this endeavor, the Argentine Government would gain a certain advantage whichever side the American Government was made to appear to favor. If official expressions by the US are taken as supporting British claims, the US will be a target for nationalist, Communist, and other anti-US groups in the hemisphere. If Argentina could, either at the Conference or later, elicit signs of support by the US for Argentine claims, this support would undoubtedly be exploited to the fullest against the British position in the Falklands.

The form and timing of Argentine attempts to make good the Falklands claims will also be governed by events in Antarctica, by the success of British resistance to Argentine advances in that area, and by the form in which Antarctic claims are eventually settled. In an exposition of the Perón administration's policy in the Falklands made in March 1947, Foreign Minister Bramuglia said: "The problems of the Antarctic and the Malvinas Islands are different; they have different origins and they require different solutions." Despite these differences, the Foreign Minister commented, the two problems have "a certain regional and political similarity." This regional and political similarity, which inheres in the fact that both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica are to some extent based on the Falklands, means that British weakness in face of Argentine advances in Antarctica may be construed as an invitation to Argentina to move to force withdrawal of the British from the Falklands.

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II. ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICAA. Background of the Antarctic Question

International interest in the potential resources and in the strategic and prestige value of Antarctic territory is currently at the highest peak since the discovery of the area. British, Argentine, and Chilean maneuvers during the 1948 season in the Palmer Peninsula area of Antarctica, which are only the latest in a series of moves made by these governments to support claims between 20°W and 90°W, have brought into focus the general problem of overlapping territorial claims in Antarctica. Argentina claims a sector lying between 25°W and 74°W and south of 60°S, including Palmer Peninsula, the South Shetlands, South Orkneys, and other island groups. In connection with its claims in the Antarctic and the Falklands, it also asserts sovereignty over the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands which lie north of its Antarctic claim. The Argentine claim overlaps both the British claim between 20°W and 80°W and the Chilean claim between 53°W and 90°W, and is potentially in conflict with US reserved rights in Antarctica. The American Government has so far abstained from a formal claim to Antarctic territory, but has reserved its rights in the area and has refused to recognize claims of other countries. (See attached map)

The bases for claims already made in Antarctica comprise discovery, assertion of sovereignty, exploration, exercise of authority, occupation, historical rights, contiguity, and geological affinity. Because of the peculiar nature of Antarctic territory, legal requirements for the establishment of valid title to Antarctic claims cannot readily be deduced from rules of international law and standards applicable to the conditions of this area have yet to become the subject of a special international agreement. Meanwhile, the various claimants have attempted to strengthen their rights through activity in Antarctica. Claims in Antarctica by Britain and potential claims by the US are based chiefly on discovery, exploration, and some type of occupation. In addition the British Government

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formally asserted its claims in 1908 and has exercised a degree of supervision over the sector claimed from its base in the Falklands. The South American claims depend largely upon proximity and the questionable principle of geological continuity.* Argentina also places heavy reliance on the fact that it is the only power which has maintained permanent occupation of any point in Antarctica over a long period, but this occupation appears to have little standing at international law as the basis of a claim to a wide area in the Antarctic. Likewise Argentine claims on the basis of expeditions, exercise of authority, and assertions of sovereignty do not compare favorably with British claims. The Chilean position in Antarctica which rests on shadowy historical rights, early assertions of sovereignty, and recent occupation of a base in Antarctica as well as the principles of proximity and geological continuity, is in turn less well-founded than Argentina's

* Argentina has advanced the thesis that the Andes extension through the Falkland, South Sandwich, South Georgia, South Orkney, and South Shetland Islands to the Palmer Peninsula is a valid basis for its claims in Antarctica. Chile likewise asserts the Andes extension to Antarctica as a basis for its claim. On the basis of sonic soundings and geological investigations, the intrusion of the Andes via the Falkland and other islands into the Palmer Peninsula appears to be a fact. (Stanley Kemp, "The South Sandwich Islands", British Colonial Office, Discovery Reports, Vol. II (1931), 154, 197). Thus, in the unlikely event that geological continuity were accepted as a basis for Antarctic claims and Argentina's rights in the Falkland Islands were recognized, the Argentine Government would be able to assert such a claim. The Chilean claim, which appears to lack scientific confirmation, would not compete with the Argentine claim.

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claim.*

The American and British Governments appear to have the only substantial practical interest in the yet unproven potentialities of the Antarctic. Its strategic value exists, if at all, only in terms of the problems of world powers; and the great powers alone can fully exploit the scientific and economic possibilities of the area. But Argentina and Chile have developed a stake in Antarctica as a source of prestige at home and abroad. This barren area offers an unrivaled exercise ground for aggressive military and diplomatic activity with none of the usual penalties of such activity, and has thereby secured an importance to these governments out of proportion to its real value to them. Superficially the Argentine forward movement and Chilean maneuvers in Antarctica are harmless means of providing a release for nationalist feelings. But nationalist aspirations are being strengthened in the process and popular expectations now being aroused may render more difficult the eventual settlement of Antarctic claims. Moreover, the British Government fears that continued Argentine moves in Antarctica will eventually extend northward to the disputed Falkland Islands and will adversely affect the position of other British territories.

B. Review of Argentine Position to 1939

During the first phase of Antarctic exploration, from 1820 to 1840, the newly-established Government of

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- * The wider question of the standing of various types of claims and the bases for such claims by interested countries is dealt with at length in OIR Report No. 4436, September 12, 1947, Basis for Possible US Claims in Antarctica. Secret, and in CIA Map Report No. M-1, History and Current Status of Claims in Antarctica (to be issued). Secret.

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the United Provinces was satisfied to assert control over its continental territory. At this time it was too weak even to resist the British occupation of the Falklands in 1833, which was itself a reflection of British operations in the Antarctic region. With the exhaustion of the seal fisheries about 1840, US and European activity in the Antarctic almost ceased until the last decade of the century. The development of scientific and commercial interest in the Antarctic then brought a revival of international activity in the area which has continued almost without interruption to the present day.

Argentina made its debut in the Antarctic in 1903 when the government sponsored a mission to relieve a Swedish expedition stranded at Hope Bay in the Palmer Peninsula. In the following year the government accepted from a Scottish expedition the offer of its equipment and a weather station at Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, and has continued since that time to maintain a year-round station on the Island. Although occupation of this island subsequently has become an important element in Argentine claims, the government originally made no formal claim of sovereignty; and when the British Government by Letters Patent of 1908 annexed a large Antarctic area including the South Orkneys, the Argentine Government failed to protest this assertion of sovereignty.

Argentina's first claim to sovereign jurisdiction over Antarctic territory appears to have been made in 1923. In that year the Argentine Government registered a protest with the Universal Postal Union against the issuance of a British stamp for the Falkland Islands Dependencies which showed the British Claim as established in Letters Patent of 1917 amending the Letters Patent issued in 1908. Argentina, it was stated, exercised "territorial jurisdiction ... de jure and de facto over its continental surface, its territorial sea and over the islands situated on its sea coast, over part of the island of Tierra del Fuego, over the Islands of Los Estados, Año Nuevo, the South Georgias, the South Orkneys, and polar areas which have not been delimited." Again in 1928 the Argentine Foreign Office reiterated this claim to the

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Universal Postal Union in connection with Argentina's establishment of a radio station at the South Orkney's base, and to the British Government which had protested the installation of the station. These protests and the exchange of notes with the British appear to have had no repercussions when made and there is no evidence that the Argentine Government made any serious attempt to develop its claims to sovereignty in Antarctica until more than a decade later.

C. Review of Argentine Position, 1939-1948

1. Initial Moves, 1939-1940. Argentine claims in the Antarctic and the public statement of these claims began to crystallize in 1939. Positive official acts in support of Argentina's claims had been limited to continued maintenance of the Laurie Island station and to the protests and exchange of notes with the British Government in the 1920's which were noted above. Argentine rights in the Falklands had become a theme of renewed interest in 1934 in the backwash of nationalist and anti-British feeling from economic difficulties of the depression (see p. 6-7), but the Antarctic attracted little or no attention. The initial stimulus to interest appears to have been provided in the uneasy summer of 1939 by the announcement of the Byrd Expedition and Norway's move to call an International Polar Exposition and Congress of Arctic explorers at Bergen. By decree of July 15, 1939, the Argentine Government set up a commission in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to plan for participation in the Bergen Conference and to study "the possibility of carrying out, on behalf of the State, thorough exploration in that part of the Antarctic regions which are considered most closely connected with the Argentine Territory." The preamble to the decree cited Argentina's maintenance of a permanent observatory in the Antarctic, naval expeditions, and geographic and geological bases for Argentine "interest" in the region, but made no mention of "claims" or "rights" in the Antarctic such as had been made in the statements published in the 1920's. The Commission was specifically charged to "make a full study of the present state of the problems of the Antarctic and their eventual connection with Argentine interests, and it will also propose to the

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Executive Power a plan of action comprising matters of oceanographic and meteorologic nature, as well as fishing and exploration such as the country may take upon itself to make."

When first published on July 15, 1939, the decree attracted no attention, providing a measure of the absence of public interest in Argentina's position in the Antarctic. But, beginning on July 24, the entire Buenos Aires press simultaneously gave heavy coverage to the decree, to the forthcoming Bergen conference, to Argentine Antarctic claims, and to the possibility that the Byrd Expedition foreshadowed assertion of claims by the American Government. Embassy Buenos Aires reported that the points taken up and the phraseology used were so similar as to warrant the belief that, despite the expressed surprise of the Foreign Office at the aggressive and provocative tone adopted by the press, the campaign was officially inspired. The critical reaction abroad to the Argentine press campaign brought a statement by the Argentine Embassy in Washington that the "Foreign Office ..., without any intention against any friendly country, is only considering the unquestionable interests of Argentina in those regions within a criterion of permanent collaboration with the other countries who are carrying out their action in the Antarctic." This statement appears to have closed the affair.

With the outbreak of war the government's plans to advance Argentine "interests" at Bergen (which was in any case to have been a strictly scientific conference) were forestalled by the cancellation of the conference. Anxiety concerning the objectives of the Byrd Expedition of 1940 was apparently allayed by official assurances from the US that it was "not intended to prejudice in any way the rights or interests which any American Republic may have in the Antarctic regions" and would in fact serve to safeguard hemisphere rights in Antarctica and to prevent encroachments by non-hemisphere powers. Moreover special facilities were provided to Argentina and Chile to permit designated representatives to visit the Byrd headquarters in the Antarctic.

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At the Panama meeting of Foreign Ministers of September 1939 and subsequently the Argentine Government spoke in terms of Argentine "claims and rights in the Antarctic," "possession and sovereignty over certain Antarctic areas," "Antarctic regions claimed by the Argentine Republic," and so forth. But the language of its reservations and statements continued vague and general. In connection with Argentina's standard reservation of rights in the Falklands in the Panama Declaration establishing a hemisphere defense zone, Foreign Minister Leopoldo Melo stated that "the legitimate claims and rights of the Argentine Republic are reserved and maintained intact with respect to islands such as the Malvinas, as well as any other Argentine lands which might be situated within or beyond the line." (italics supplied)

In reconstituting on a permanent basis the Commission originally established to prepare for the Bergen Conference, the government charged it "to centralize and take charge of the study and advice relative to all matters connected with the protection and development of national interests in the Antarctic region and in the Antarctic Continent ..." and made no specific territorial claim. The reservation of Argentina's rights in the Falklands at the Habana Meeting of Foreign Ministers in June 1940 again included a proviso on the Antarctic, which was simply described as "other southern Argentine regions." Moreover, when the Chilean Government, which followed Argentina's example in reserving rights in the Antarctic at the Habana Meeting, proclaimed Chilean sovereignty over the sector lying between 53 and 90 degrees west longitude, the Argentine Government did not make a counterclaim to a specific area, but merely stated "that the situation created by the unilateral claims to zones of the Antarctic made by various states, to which Chilean claims are now added, can be satisfactorily settled from an international point of view only by means of a conference of the interested States and through an agreement among them on the basis of their just claims and rights." However, it welcomed Chile's suggestion that the two countries meet to agree on their rights in the Antarctic. Meetings subsequently

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held with the Chileans in March 1941 were inconclusive and were not resumed as planned, reportedly because of conditions in Argentina and in the world at large. (For review of Chilean position, see p.24).

2. Forward Movement, 1941-43. Argentine activities in the Antarctic passed into a more positive phase in 1941. As noted above, in this year the government made a tentative approach to the American Ambassador to explore the possibility of securing a British withdrawal from the Falkland Islands. At the same time Argentina was preparing to move forward in Antarctica proper with the purpose of staking claims and making new installations. The forward movement was a natural sequel to the diplomatic demarches, official propaganda, and public discussions that began early in 1939. In addition, conflicting and unresolved Chilean claims, the temporary withdrawal of British stations in Antarctica, the possibility that Britain would be defeated by the Axis, the fact that the Drake Passage would be an important channel if for any reason the Panama Canal were closed, and the lack of response to Argentina's proposal for an international conference may have contributed to the decision to expand the bases of Argentine "claims and rights in Antarctica" and to define those claims.

The Argentine Government in November 1941 declared the opening of a permanent post office in the Orkneys, which placed on a formal basis the postal facilities maintained at Laurie Island since 1904, and began to prepare an expedition for the 1942 Antarctic season. In February 1942 the Argentine Antarctic expedition made Argentina's first specific claim to a sector of the Antarctic. The commander of the naval transport Primero de Mayo left a document at strategic Deception Island in the South Shetlands "reaffirming" Argentine rights over the sector between 25°W and 68°34'W, south of 60°S. At the same time the Argentine representative took formal possession of Deception Island, placing Argentine markers and painting the national colors on British installations. In May 1942 the Argentine Government proceeded to install a lighthouse at Dallman Bay, Melchior Archipelago, southwest of the

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Shetlands. Partly as a countermove to Argentine activity the British Government in January 1943 sent a cruiser through the South Shetlands and South Orkneys with instructions to destroy Argentine markers at Deception Island and replace them with British emblems of sovereignty. Subsequently the British Government notified the Argentine Foreign Office of its action, expressing "surprise and regret" at Argentina's attempt to assert possession of Deception Island. In its reply of February 1943 the Argentine Foreign Office reaffirmed the sector claimed in the documents deposited at Deception and thereby put the British Government formally on notice for the first time that it claimed a sector superimposed upon the greater part of the British sector (20°W to 80°W) as well as the islands south of the Falklands which had been the subject of previous declarations. Although the Argentine Government expressed its "most formal reservations to jurisdictional acts carried out by British officials" within the Argentine claim, both governments agreed to give the episode no publicity. Moreover, when the Primero de Mayo visited Deception Island in March 1943 on a second survey expedition, apparently no further provocation was offered the British, although the Argentine press reported that the markers left in 1942 had been removed.

3. Suspension of Activity under de facto Government.

The question of Argentine claims in the Antarctic appears to have been shelved during the period of the de facto government which assumed control in June 1943. The unstable character of the government and the grave problems that it faced meant that Argentina's claims in Antarctica, which had been advanced chiefly for their prestige value, had a low priority. Moreover, since the de facto government was anxious to assure continued recognition by the British Government, its chief rival in Antarctica, it was in no position to ruffle British feelings by pressing Argentine claims. During this period the British Government established token settlements in the Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina. There is no record that the Argentine Government registered a protest, and the lighthouse established

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in the Melchior Archipelago in 1942 was allowed to go out of commission. Annual relief missions to the Orkneys continued, but Argentine activity in the Antarctic as in the Falklands was put on a standby basis.

4. Second Forward Movement, 1946-date. With the election of Perón in February 1946 and the establishment of the government on a firm constitutional basis, Argentina's forward movement in the Antarctic was resumed. The new government was no longer so greatly in need of British support for its international position; it also was ambitious to reestablish Argentine prestige abroad. The Antarctic claims were well designed for this purpose. There was little danger that assertion of claims would lead to an international incident. Because of the peculiar nature of the region in dispute the government could send notes, protests, and expeditions almost at will without suffering the usual consequences of such action, and was assured of the unanimous support of all political groups and of public opinion in general for an aggressive policy. Thus the government could anticipate a return from its efforts both in domestic and foreign affairs out of proportion to the risks involved and the expenditure required to fit out naval expeditions and make new installations in Antarctica. Moreover, as the war ended, foreign activity in the area was renewed in 1946 and the spur of competition provided to Argentine policy-makers.

Less than a month after the elections which ensured its continuation in power, the Perón administration reactivated the National Antarctic Commission by decree of March 23, 1946, a move described as "one of the most significant steps taken by the Argentine Republic initiating a great campaign to consolidate its rights in the Antarctic region." Under a decree of September 2, 1946, the government prohibited publication of maps which failed to show all Argentine territory, including the Antarctic sector, and vested the Instituto Geografico Militar with supervision over maps published. In November 1946 the Instituto issued a map extending Argentine claims to include 25°W to 74°W instead of 68°34'W,

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and new stamps showed Argentine claims. In connection with the drive to create a "national Antarctic-mindedness", "active journalistic propaganda by means of systematic publications" and celebration of Argentine anniversaries relating to the Antarctic were promoted by the National Antarctic Commission. The Argentine Chamber of Deputies in July 1946 approved unanimously a motion that the government submit the nation's claims to the Falklands and Antarctica to the Security Council (see p. 7). The Foreign Office protested British claims as occasion offered. It also undertook in July 1947 to reach an agreement with Chile on a common boundary and it renewed Argentina's proposal that an international conference be held to settle the problem of the Antarctic as a whole.

The government climaxed this verbal offensive in December 1946 by preparing an expedition to establish new bases in the Antarctic. Unilateral action by the various interested countries to improve their several positions had already become the order of the day. During the 1947 season two expeditions from the US and one from Chile visited the polar regions and British expeditions had already established token settlements in the sector claimed by the British and Argentine Governments. The Argentine expedition, as the Ministry of Marine somewhat extravagantly put it, would complement "the chain of installations based in the Orkneys ..." and would explore Antarctica as far west as 74°W. The Foreign Office rejected a British offer to assist the "Argentine visitors" who might call at the British stations as "not consistent with reality, because a visitor cannot be considered as such when he visits his own property."

During its visit to Argentine "property", which received headline press treatment at home, the 1947 expedition provided the annual relief party for Argentina's base at Laurie Island, recommissioned the lighthouse set up at Dallman Bay, Melchior Archipelago in 1942, installed several new beacons, and left a group of men at a Melchior Archipelago station on Gamma Island. Anchoring supply ships at

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Deception Island, it cruised down the western coast of Graham Land to Marguerite Bay, conducting hydrographic research and extensive chart and astronomical work, and on its return to Argentina, left a ship anchored at Deception Island. As Foreign Minister Bramuglia summed up the work of the expedition, it had constituted "one of the most important operations effected thus far in the Antarctic. Our country ... has the satisfaction of having contributed to the knowledge of that region and of having actually been in its Antarctic zone with a fleet of seven ships, at the same time that other powerful nations were making similar efforts in other parts of the southern continent."

Renewed Argentine activity in the expedition of 1947 conflicted chiefly with British pretensions in the Antarctic area. The American expeditions of that year led by Admiral Byrd and Commander Finn Ronne did not enter the "Argentine sector". In reciprocation for an Argentine invitation to Chilean officers in 1943 the Chilean expedition of 1947 had invited the participation of Argentine representatives. In turn Chilean officers accompanied the Argentine expedition. This spirit of accord in Argentine-Chilean relations in Antarctica was further signalized by a joint declaration of July 12, 1947 during President Gonzalez Videla's stay in Buenos Aires that the two governments were "desirous of putting into effect a friendly policy for determining frontiers" and "that they desire to conclude as soon as possible an Argentine-Chilean treaty of demarcation of limits of South American Antarctica."

The Rio Conference of August-September 1947 afforded the Perón Administration a new chance to lend color to its Antarctic claims in connection with the demarcation of the hemisphere defense zone. The limits of this zone were laid down by a sub-committee of Committee II to cover the area originally demarcated at the Panama Meeting of 1939, which did not overlap British claims in Antarctica. At the instance of the Argentine and Chilean delegations the zone was enlarged to cover the entire area claimed by these two countries and to blanket in all but a small sector of the British

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"juridico-political status" of Antarctica. Simultaneously the Argentine Ministry of Marine announced the dispatch of an Argentine task force of cruisers, destroyers, auxiliary ships, and airplanes for maneuvers in the Antarctic and a visit to Deception Island. The British Government replied to this move by sending the cruiser Nigeria to show the flag in Antarctic waters. Similarly the Chilean Government embarked its President to the area to assert Chilean claims.

Recent British activity in the area has been widely criticized by public opinion in the other American republics as an "aggression" against the hemisphere, and the minor crisis brought on by the dispute over Antarctica has raised in a confused form the largely unrelated issues of the sanctity of the hemisphere defense zone, old-established territorial disputes between Latin American and European countries, and the general problem of colonial policy of the great powers in the postwar era. The US Government has again stated that the establishment of the hemisphere defense zone in no way affects non-continental rights in the hemisphere, but it remains to be seen what effect this disclaimer will have in moderating Latin American demands for retaliatory action against British "aggression". (For review of Latin American opinion, see p.30)

D. Current Argentine Policy in Antarctica

The Antarctic policy of Perón has been more aggressive than the policy followed by preceding administrations. The change reflects the increased stature of Argentina and the anxiety of the government to capitalize on its relatively improved position. The Antarctic is of little practical value to Argentina, but the Antarctic controversy affords Perón a means of increasing his administration's prestige at home and abroad. The area is an appropriate stage for action because, unlike the Falklands, it is the subject of a number of ill-defined claims; it has not been occupied in any real sense by competing powers; and it provides a safe exercise ground for displays of force. Army, naval, and air missions to the Antarctic are calculated to impress Argentina's neighbors without giving rise to problems which are usually associated with aggression

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claim. Both governments reserved their claims to territories within the zone in signing the Rio Treaty. Although the delegation of the US acceded to the enlargement of the defense zone, it stated for the record that "the treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories included therein." Argentine and Chilean officials, however, have tended to construe the extension of the defense zone as providing support for the claim that the Antarctic area included within its bounds belongs to the two hemisphere claimants, Argentina and Chile.

Argentine activity during the current Antarctic open season has continued along the lines laid down by the reconstructed National Antarctic Commission in 1946, but has secured international notice as a consequence of British protests and moves to counter South American claims in the "British sector." The 1948 Argentine expedition set up a radio station at the Gamma Island station in Melchior Archipelago and built a hut on King George Island in the South Shetlands. It also established radio and weather stations at Deception Island where, as noted above, markers left by the Argentine expedition of 1942 were removed by a British cruiser in 1943. On December 13, 1947 a 2500-mile non-stop flight was made by an Argentine naval plane which passed over Deception Island and Melchior Archipelago and reached latitude 67°S and 68°W. This flight was described by the Chief of Naval Aviation, Rear Admiral Portillo, as "a demonstration that the Antarctic is ours, not only by ocean navigation, but by air, since we are able to arrive there at any time to resolve our problems."

The British Government formally protested Argentine and Chilean activity in its Antarctic zone by notes of December 17 and 23, 1947. It suggested that the South American claimants should operate under British concessions, or, alternatively, either withdraw or submit their claims to the International Court of Justice. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments have rejected this proposal, and Argentina in its reply of January 28 suggested that an international conference meet in Buenos Aires to determine the

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directed toward inhabited areas. The dispatch of the British cruiser Nigeria has aided Perón in his efforts to dramatize the controversy and has excited Argentine interest in the area even more effectively than the flood of official propaganda on Argentine claims and activities in Antarctica. The Argentine Government's policy in Antarctica has, furthermore, evoked expressions of support from many other American republics following the British move to counter Argentina's advance in the area.

Argentine policy toward competing powers in Antarctica has been defined as regards Britain and Chile: Argentina refuses to acknowledge British sovereignty in the region and has challenged the British claim at one of its strongest points by making installations at Deception Island and by using the island as a center for naval maneuvers. The dispatch of a British cruiser does not appear to have discouraged Argentine moves to assert Antarctic claims. The British have demanded that Argentina acknowledge British sovereignty, withdraw Argentine forces, or submit the question of claims to the International Court. Continued Argentine activity and the counter-proposal that a conference be held in Buenos Aires to settle Antarctic claims indicates that Argentina is not interested in a settlement of its dispute with the British Government on any terms that the latter would willingly accept.

Argentine policy toward Chile is conciliatory: it appears directed to prove that there is no important conflict between Argentine and Chilean claims; that the two South American governments form a united front against the British claimant; and that the matter of overlapping Argentine-Chilean claims can be settled through negotiation. The Chileans appear to be uneasy in their position as junior partner to Argentina, and, although undoubtedly pleased to have Argentine support in rejecting British claims, the Chilean Government obviously fears that the next stages of the controversy may find them in an inferior position to Argentina. But under present conditions, with the dispute involving only the South American powers and Britain, Argentina enjoys Chilean cooperation for all public purposes in

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asserting exclusive rights to the "South American sector" of the Antarctic and gains strength from this cooperation.

The claims of the US in the area under dispute have not been defined and Argentine policy as regards the United States has therefore still to be settled. The most recent exchange of notes on the subject took place prior to the Byrd Expedition and did not commit either government to more than the maintenance of the "open door" in Antarctica by the claimant powers. The American Government at that time announced that the Byrd Expedition was not intended to affect South American rights and claims in Antarctica and the Argentine Government in turn expressed its appreciation of this reassurance.

Argentina's stated policy as regards the method and terms of settlement has been developed within the frame of its dispute with the British Government, and, perhaps for this reason, is more uncompromising than it might otherwise have been. Argentina has refused adjudication by the International Court and has offered to hold a conference in Buenos Aires to settle the Antarctic question. It has announced that Argentina will insist on its right to a national zone and that concessions from the claim of land lying between 25°W and 74°W will be made only at the western boundary with the Chilean claim. Presumably the demand that an extensive zone be placed under Argentine sovereignty is unlikely to be agreed upon by other claimants, and therefore Argentine policy as announced to date would be a negative factor in any attempt to reach a settlement. That the Perón administration might recede from its publicly-stated position is indicated by the Foreign Minister's statement in March 1948 that Argentina is prepared to "argue" the Antarctic question. To what extent Argentina might compromise its claims and what method of settlement it would accept has not, however, been revealed.

E. The Chilean Position in Antarctica

The record of Chilean interest in Antarctica ante-dates Argentine activity in the area, but is of

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an even more tenuous nature. Chilean claims are based largely on succession to Spanish rights in Antarctica, which are contestable; on acts of authority exercised in the region, which are unconvincing in comparison with those of other claimants; on geological continuity, which appears to lack scientific foundation (see footnote, p. 10); and on geographical proximity. Chile's first expedition to the Antarctic took place in 1947 and at that time the Chilean Government established its first Antarctic base at Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands, an area which is also claimed by the British and Argentine Governments.

The modern phase of Chile's interest in Antarctica, beginning in 1939, appears to have grown out of the same set of circumstances as Argentine interest (see p. 13). In signing the Act of Habana in July 1940, the Chilean Delegation reserved "the rights of Chile in Antarctica", and the Government proceeded in November 1940 to fix the boundaries of Chilean claims in Antarctica, asserting Chilean sovereignty between 53°W and 90°W. This decree, the Government stated, was not a claim to sovereignty but merely formalized undoubted Chilean rights in the area. Of the American and interested non-American powers whom Chile notified of its action, the United States, Britain, Argentina, and Japan reserved their rights or refused recognition of Chile's claim. The US suggested in its reply of December 1940 that "it would be desirable for representatives at least of the governments of the American Republics that are most directly interested in the possibility of the Antarctic regions to convene in a friendly meeting at an opportune time to assess their respective claims and to discuss the possible terms of an agreement concerning these matters." Although the Chilean Government promised to study the US proposal, no further official exchange took place on the subject of a conference between the two governments. The Chilean Government had offered for its part to undertake conversations with Argentina in response to the Argentine reservation of rights in Antarctica, and preliminary conversations in fact took place early in 1941. However, they were inconclusive and it is possible that failure to reach

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an agreement with Argentina as well as wartime conditions were responsible for Chile's lack of response to the offer of the US to confer on Antarctic claims;

Argentine-Chilean cooperation in Antarctica has developed naturally from the fact that both countries find their chief support in the claim from geographical proximity. Although the conversations held in 1941 came to nothing, the Argentine expedition of 1943 included three Chilean naval officers, and again in 1947 expeditions the two countries exchanged personnel. The accord was formally signalized on Argentina's initiative during the visit of President Gonzalez Videla to Buenos Aires in July 1947, when the two governments agreed to conclude a boundary treaty "as early as possible." Following Argentine and Chilean moves against British claims in Antarctica in February 1948 and the return of President Gonzalez Videla from his mission to Antarctica early in March, a second declaration was issued strengthening the original declaration. The declaration of March 1948, which apparently was also made on Argentine initiative, stated that the two governments would establish their boundaries within the year and that they would "act by common agreement in the protection and juridical defense of rights in South American Antarctica, in which territories both recognize unquestionable sovereign rights ... and will continue administrative action, exploration, vigilance and development in the undefined boundary region in their respective Antarctic zones in a spirit of reciprocal cooperation."

Despite the public cooperation of the two governments, Chilean officials have indicated to representatives of the US that the Argentine-Chilean accord has been more apparent than real. The Argentine naval officers who accompanied the first Chilean expedition of 1947 were regarded by the Chilean Government as an embarrassment and secret instructions were issued to the commander of the expedition to prevent their presence at the formal ceremony of annexation in order to forestall reservations of Argentine rights. In October 1947 the Chilean Government was reported opposed to reaching a final

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settlement of boundaries with Argentina, and it is noteworthy that both the joint declarations of 1947 and 1948 were the product of Argentine initiative. Chilean activity in the 1948 season apparently reflected fear that Argentine pretensions in Antarctica were being made good at the expense of Chile as well as the overt rivalry with the British. In fact Chilean assertions of sovereignty against the British were probably more strident than they might otherwise have been because the Chilean Government felt itself weak as against both the Argentine and British claims.

Chilean policy as regards Antarctica must necessarily reckon with the fact that the Chilean Government will not play a leading part in the eventual settlement of Antarctic claims and with the likelihood that its success will depend upon the degree of Argentine success because the two governments claim on a similar basis. These two factors make for a somewhat delicate situation. Chile must beware of submerging its interests in those of Argentina, but it must also support the lead which Argentina is able to give because of its superior status and resources in establishing South American rights in Antarctica.

F. Future Prospects

Argentina's Antarctic policy has developed chiefly from its dispute with the British Government over sovereign rights in the area, and is at present roughly parallel to Chilean policy. When and if the American Government states its position with respect to Antarctica and its views on the appropriate method of settling disputed claims, the position of the present contenders will be to some extent modified. Under present circumstances the stalemate between the South American governments and the UK could continue indefinitely to provide a subject for agitation. The immediate political stimulus to activity and the scope for maneuvers have been lessened with the conclusion of the Argentine elections early in March and the approaching end of the Antarctic summer season. But agitation of South American claims in Antarctica holds continued advantages for prestige purposes and may also serve as a

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means of weakening the British position in the Falklands.

The Bogotá Conference will probably be used as a forum by the Argentine Government, either alone or in collaboration with the Chilean Government, as an opportunity to mobilize the support of the other American republics for Antarctic claims. In this case the claims will be linked with the general question of territorial disputes between Britain and the other American republics, notably the Falklands and Belize issues, and with the entire problem of non-continental claims and "aggressions" within the hemisphere defense zone. As a dramatic current issue involving "aggression" in the defense zone by the British Government, the Antarctic controversy will undoubtedly supply ammunition for irredentist claims against European possessions in the hemisphere, and in turn the South American claimants stand to secure backing in Antarctica from countries opposing European colonial claims.

In the matter of territorial claims of Latin American governments against European powers the United States has taken the position that the establishment of the hemisphere defense zone does not affect European territorial rights in the Western Hemisphere and has indicated that such claims are problems to be settled between the parties directly involved. The policy of the US may suffer in comparison with Argentine policy if the Argentine delegation points up the contrast between its championship of Latin American rights and the lukewarm and neutral position of the US delegation. Following the line of Argentine representatives at the ITO Conference in Habana and on other occasions, they may be able to use the comparison to indicate that the interests of the US are at odds with the interests of the other American republics.

It may be predicted that the Argentine Government will, whatever happens at the Bogotá Conference, continue to carry on operations in Antarctica. To the extent that it expands these operations, its claims in Antarctica will be improved as against those of other governments and will become a fixed element in national

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policy. In any case it may be expected that the Argentine Government will find time on its side in the Antarctic dispute and will be inclined to put off a settlement which might foreclose use of Antarctica as an exercise ground for the Argentine Navy and Foreign Office.

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III. FORECAST OF LATIN AMERICAN POSITION AT BOGOTA

The dramatic assertions of sovereignty made by the claimant governments in Antarctica and the Belize affair evoked widespread comment throughout Latin America. The bulk of this comment has not been addressed directly to the specific issues presented by the Antarctic and Falklands disputes but rather to the broader question of European colonial possessions in the hemisphere. Because of this fact and because the Antarctic, Falklands, and Belize issues -- however diverse -- will probably be linked together at Bogotá, the following discussion deals with the reactions of the various countries to the territorial disputes as a whole as well as to Argentina's claims.

A. General Considerations

The reactions so far publicly expressed, which have undoubtedly encouraged Latin American claimants to hope for good support when the Conference meets, point to certain factors which will work in their favor. They can anticipate that many of the Latin American governments will be influenced by the small-country, anti-imperialist psychology already widely evidenced in the Latin American press. Argentina can be expected to attempt to reinforce these sentiments by bringing pressure to bear directly on the governments or indirectly through an appeal to conform to majority views. Such propaganda efforts will be especially effective to the extent that the US and Latin American delegations fail to see eye to eye on other issues, as for example on the economic needs of Latin America. Other factors, however, may weaken the position of the Latin American claimants. Friction between their governments and certain of their neighbors will operate to reduce overall support for the respective claims of Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala. A desire to cooperate with the US to the degree possible and the growing sense of responsibility in international politics felt by some of the leading republics will have a similar effect. Some of the governments hope to dispose of the question of disputed territories as rapidly as possible or to give it a low priority for discussion either because they fear to revive latent

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inter-American border disputes or because their interest in other items on the agenda is paramount.

Which influences operate most strongly on the group depends largely upon the circumstances of the moment at which the Guatemalan or other resolutions come to be debated and voted upon. As of mid-March the agitation over territorial claims had diminished considerably from the peak reached at the time British warships were dispatched to Antarctica and Belize. Another incident of the same order would again raise Latin American temperatures and merely the discussion of the territorial disputes at Bogotá might have the same result. In the presence of renewed agitation, governments wishing to cooperate with the US or merely to maintain a non-committal position would be under heavy pressure to join the champions of hemisphere rights and to abandon their intention of cooperating with the US. On the other hand the world situation may be of overriding importance. Thus the Chilean Government itself has already indicated that, in view of the present international situation, it will avoid action that might embarrass the American Government, and the Foreign Minister assured the American Ambassador early in March that Chile would not seek inter-American action at Bogotá, but would merely enter its Antarctic claim as a matter of record.

B. Reactions of Non-Claimant Countries

Of the leading Latin American governments which have not so far announced territorial claims, those of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba were opposed to agitation of the territorial issue as of mid-March. The Brazilian government appears best able to maintain this position since public opinion in that country seems indifferent to the Latin American claims and the main potential source of agitation against "imperialism", the Communist Party, has for some months been suppressed. The other governments named above would encounter more serious problems if faced with intense public agitation favoring the Latin American position and they might well be forced to abandon a neutral position in favor of "Latin American solidarity." However, in normal circumstances they can be expected to be obstructive

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or non-committal with reference to agitation of the territorial disputes. The United States may also secure the support of some of the Central American and Caribbean delegations, because of their dislike of Guatemala or because they normally support the US at international gatherings.

Standing somewhere in between these countries and the champions of hemisphere claims is the Mexican Government. It has committed itself to solidarity with Latin American claims, but it has declared for a temperate approach, and will probably be governed to a large extent by circumstances at the time of the Conference and by the position of the majority.

Of the three claimants to disputed territory, Chile and Guatemala have been the most zealous in seeking moral support from the US and the other American republics. Chile, as noted above, may temper its policy considerably and Guatemala lacks the standing to organize widespread support for its position. Argentina, which would in any case be the natural leader because of its prestige, will undoubtedly be the most effective of the group in lobbying for support of a strong resolution on territorial disputes. As the dominant country in southern South America it is assured of the support of Paraguay and may be able to detach Uruguay and Bolivia from the neutral position which these countries have so far maintained. Ecuador, which takes a serious view of Latin American claims, can be expected to respond readily to Argentine arguments. Whether Argentina can also obtain the support of Peru and of the small Central American and Caribbean governments in whose countries its representatives have been actively cultivating Argentine interests is a matter of speculation.

Specific reactions of the Latin American countries who are not parties to the disputes as developed to early March are discussed below.

Brazil: The Brazilian Government is in complete accord with the neutral attitude of the American Government with regard to claims to disputed territory which may be advanced at the Bogotá Conference. The Foreign

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Minister, moreover, has made positive efforts to quiet the dispute. The Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago was instructed to indicate to the Chilean Government Brazil's deep concern over agitation tending to embarrass the UK and give aid and comfort to its enemies and to urge the use of existing machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes. In effect Chile was warned against serving as a catspaw for Argentine interests. The Brazilian Ambassador in Asunción also expressed disapproval of the Paraguayan Foreign Minister's recent attempt to link latent Brazilian claims in the Guianas to the current question.

The Brazilian Government will apparently not be under pressure from the domestic press to alter its stand and will not be subject to Communist-inspired agitation. It will be sensitive to pressure to conform to the views of its Latin American neighbors, but not to the extent of altering its policy which is inspired in about equal parts by a desire to play the role of a responsible world power, by its interest in cooperating with the US, and by its tendency to checkmate Argentine pretensions when possible.

Bolivia: The Bolivian Foreign Minister, who has expressed complete agreement with the US position regarding territorial disputes, indicated his neutrality in response to requests of the Chilean and Guatemalan governments for support of their territorial claims. The Bolivian press has paid little attention to the disputes. The one editorial that had appeared on the subject as of March 10, praised the "new American international policy" as opposed to "colonial submission" but the Bolivian Government will probably not be open to any strong pressure of public opinion. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that an Argentine request for support would be difficult to refuse in view of the close economic ties between the two countries.

Colombia: The Secretary-General of the Foreign Office informed the American Ambassador that Colombia's position as regards territorial disputes coincides in general with that of the US. According to a statement of another Foreign Office official on February 26,

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Colombia favors the British proposal to submit the Antarctic dispute to the Permanent Court. The Colombian Government may be subject to pressure of public opinion to change its policy on this issue. El Tiempo, right-wing Liberal daily, declared editorially that the sovereign rights of Argentina and Chile in Antarctic territories merit the support of all hemisphere countries at the Bogotá Conference. Other Liberal newspapers may well adopt the same line. Ex-president López through his organ, El Liberal, could be expected to take an "anti-colonial", "anti-imperialist" position in conformity with his general philosophy. The Gaitanista faction of the Party has been flirting with the Perón government recently and might welcome a chance to demonstrate support for Argentine interests. If the influential Liberal press as a whole adopts the cause, the Government may encounter difficulty in abstaining from support of the Latin American claimants. Moreover, since Bogotá newspapers will be read by many delegates, such a development would provide a favorable environment for the Argentine delegation operating in the conference hall lobbies.

Ecuador: The Ecuadoran Government will apparently support Latin American territorial claims at Bogotá. During a visit to Honduras early this year the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister reportedly proposed the return of European possessions to Latin American claimants as a subject for joint action. In March the Foreign Office acting avowedly "in compliance with its duties as regards solidarity which is incumbent upon the Hispano-American states in the defense of their common territorial, economic, and cultural interests" declared that (1) Ecuador is opposed to all colonial systems, especially in America; (2) the Belize and Antarctic disputes can be solved pacifically; and (3) Ecuador is prepared to cooperate to find a solution. These spontaneous expressions would seem to place the Ecuadoran delegation safely behind the claims of the Latin American governments.

Paraguay: Probably at Argentine instigation the Paraguayan Foreign Minister has expressed support of Latin American territorial claims and has even undertaken to agitate the question with the Brazilian Embassy in Asunción. In a speech of March 12 he said:

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"We are with the American nations for a pacific solution that will free the land of our countries from the European colonial regime." There appears to be little doubt that Paraguay is in the Argentine camp and will support the Latin American claimants at Bogotá.

Peru: No official response to Latin American appeals for assistance appears to have been made by Peru. The leading newspaper La Prensa and the Aprista organ Tribuna had not commented editorially on the dispute as of March 12, although an unsigned article in the latter supported South American claims to the Antarctic and Falklands. Presumably the government will not be exposed to any serious pressure from public opinion in forming its policy as regards territorial disputes and will be able to accommodate its action at Bogotá to the requirements of its relations with the US, Argentina, and the inter-American system as a whole.

Uruguay: When the Antarctic dispute first came to public notice in mid-February, President Batlle Berres told Ambassador Briggs that he favored an over-all settlement and declared that Uruguay would probably raise its claim against Argentina for Martín García Island if Argentina sought to enlist Uruguay's support. Following the meeting of the Argentine and Uruguayan Presidents on February 27 it was rumored in the Uruguayan press (1) that they had discussed the Antarctic dispute, and (2) that Perón had offered to transfer Martín García to Uruguay. The Presidents' published agreement involved settlement of the common boundary in the Uruguay River. In response to the query of the American Ambassador in early March, the Foreign Minister was non-committal as to the position that Uruguay would adopt at Bogotá regarding territorial disputes.

The pro-government Uruguayan press has not taken sides in the Antarctic disputes and editorial comment has been confined in most cases to a review of the background facts and an expression of hope that the matter will be settled peacefully and without disturbing the traditionally friendly relations between Britain, Argentina, and Chile. But the opposition Herrerista press seized upon the dispute to attack the motives and

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attitude of the US and Britain, asserting that the US failed to back Latin American rights because it wished to take over British possessions in Latin America. The Communist press has voiced support of the Chilean position in Antarctica and its comments on the issue will probably parallel those of the Nationalists. Under attack from the domestic opposition and under pressure from Argentina, the Uruguayan Government may be expected to take a stand in favor of the Latin American claimants at Bogotá.

Venezuela: The Venezuelan Government has acted with restraint in this matter, and its Foreign Office favors the position of the US on territorial disputes in general. Officials have voiced the fear that they will be forced to assert Venezuelan claims in British Guiana if the colonial question is agitated at Bogotá and that in turn Colombia may call for a revision of its border with Venezuela. Public agitation, however, threatens to weaken their ability to preserve a neutral attitude. In hope of preventing a controversial discussion of the various disputes by Congress and the press, the Government issued a communique on March 3 expressing solidarity with the American republics and at the same time suggested that the disputes be settled peacefully in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The statement did not have the desired effect, and a few days later the Venezuelan Congress passed a resolution by unanimous vote and amidst loud applause expressing solidarity with Argentina and Chile in the Antarctic dispute. The youth branch of the opposition party COPEI and students and professors of the Central University in early March voiced support of the Latin American claimants in their disputes with the British.

Venezuela's dormant claims in British Guiana, which have already been raised by the Communist press, will render the government especially vulnerable to accusations of betraying the national interest if it cooperates openly with the US in attempting to quiet the territorial disputes. The Venezuelan Government will not be vulnerable to Argentine pressure as such, but domestic politics and the general desire not to stray from the Latin American group may operate to

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change the government's position to one more favorable to Argentina and the other Latin American claimants.

Cuba: The Cuban position as expressed to the Guatemalan Government in response to the latter's circular on the colonial question followed the general lines of the Ecuadoran declaration but was not a declaration of solidarity. From this it might be assumed that the extent to which the Cuban Government might be willing to go on the Argentine-Chilean claims would be to counsel a peaceful solution of the disputes. The Cuban Foreign Minister expressed the fear to the American Ambassador that the territorial question might dominate and spoil the Bogotá Conference and, although he felt the colonial question must be settled in the longrun, obviously hoped that it would be deferred. A commentary in El Mundo of February 19, which paralleled the view of the Uruguayan nationalist newspaper El Debate, stated that Argentina fears "the United States may become a South American power" in the process of British withdrawal from its colonial possessions. What general attitude the Cuban press will adopt and whether it will operate to change the government's policy cannot be predicted.

Mexico:- The Mexican Government, which is involved indirectly in the Belize dispute, has indicated that it will support the Guatemalan resolution at Bogotá but will adopt a temperate attitude. The Mexican Government has not taken a stand on the Antarctic dispute as of the end of February and was seeking a neutral position in the matter. However, its support of Latin American claims in general will involve support of the South American claims in Antarctica and the Falklands to the extent they are linked with other claims. The Mexican Foreign Minister, like the Cuban Foreign Minister, fears that other subjects at Bogotá will suffer if the colonial question is seriously agitated during the Conference. The American Embassy reports that editorial comment on the Argentine-Chilean dispute with Britain has been reserved on the whole and it is felt that the national press will take its lead from the administration on this and other matters connected with territorial disputes.

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Other Countries: The Dominican and Haitian governments have expressed views in agreement with those of the US although they would in general also be sympathetic to the transfer of European colonies to Latin American claimants. The Honduran Foreign Minister gave a clue to his government's general position by his cool reception of an Ecuadoran proposal made in January of this year that the Latin American Governments jointly advocate transfer of European colonies to Latin claimants. The President of Panama, on the other hand, declared on March 2 that all American nations should support Chilean claims in the Antarctic in the interests of continental solidarity. Likewise the Salvadoran Foreign Minister was reported by the Guatemalan radio on March 15 to have declared that El Salvador would support the move at Bogotá to put an end to European colonies in the western hemisphere. Perhaps indicative that other Central American countries will favor Latin American pretensions is the unanimous press support for their claims reported from Nicaragua late in February. Embassy Managua commented "The unanimous and unquestioning approval given to the Argentinian, Chilean, and Guatemalan actions ... indicates that opposition to colonialism in the western hemisphere can still rally Latin American support, despite internecine fights such as that between Guatemala and Nicaragua. There is apparent here an undertone of opinion that the United States can be forced by its hemispheric commitments to support a united Latin American bloc against Britain. It is, perhaps, significant that the usual nice regard shown by the Liberal press and in particular the pro-government segment, for opposing moves that would embarrass the United States is not present here."

On the basis of the general considerations and specific reactions described above, it may be predicted that in a reasonably calm discussion of territorial issues, the delegations at Bogotá will be about equally divided among support of the Latin American claimants, maintenance of a non-committal attitude, and cooperation with the US. Under such unfavorable auspices, the Argentine government might well decide not to press the

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issue vigorously but to content itself with a mild resolution. If, however, a new incident or the discussion at Bogotá itself brings widespread agitation of the territorial issues, and in the absence of an overriding international crisis, support of the US position may drop considerably, and the Conference may adopt a strong resolution which will provide a new basis for Argentine pretensions in Antarctica and the Falklands.

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